An innovation gap has emerged as American universities have focused on basic research and industry has concentrated on incremental product development. This gap has widened in recent decades, and the country has failed to close the gap in large part because of three myths-that innovation is about lone geniuses, the free market, and serendipity.
This study by Professor Paul Griffin and co-authors David H. Lont from the University of Otago and Yuan Sun from the University of California, Berkeley Haas School of Business documents that investors care about companies’ greenhouse gas (GHG) emission disclosures.
Normal Organizational Wrongdoing: A Critical Analysis of Theories of Misconduct in and by Organizations
Oxford University Press
Instances of wrongdoing in and by organizations are prevalent in modern society, perhaps increasingly so in recent years. Why do organizational participants—employees, managers, senior officials—engage in illegal, unethical, and socially irresponsible behavior?
Using data from 1991 to 2010, U.C. Davis Professors Brad Barber and Guojun Wang analyze educational endowment returns using simple style attribution models pioneered by Sharpe (1992).
The Role of Institutional Investors in Propagating the Crisis of 2007-2008
Journal of Financial Economics, 2011
Using a novel data of institutional investors’ bond holdings, Associate Professor Ayako Yasuda and co-authors Alberto Manconi from Tilburg University and Massimo Massa from INSEAD examine a transmission of the crisis of 2007-08 from the securitized bond market to the corporate bond market via joint ownership of these bonds by investors.
The authors posit that, ceteris paribus, corporate bonds held by investors with high exposure to securitized bonds and liquidity needs experience greater selling pressure and price declines (yield increases) at the onset of the crisis.
In this study, Professor Brad Barber and co-author Terrance Odean from U.C. Berkeley provide an overview of research on individual investor stock trading behavior.
In this paper, Assistant Professor Anna Scherbina and co-author Li Jin from Harvard Business School show that new managers who take over mutual fund portfolios sell off inherited momentum losers at higher rates than stocks in any other momentum decile, even after adjusting for concurrent trades in these stocks by continuing fund managers.
Steps can be taken to pinpoint and foil premeditated corporate and white-collar crime committed by workers trying to beat the system for their own self-interest. But what about wrongdoing committed by workers who unwittingly engage in illegal activities that become woven into the fabric of the company?
In this paper Professor Michael Maher and Professor Donald Palmer analyze the mortgage meltdown as a “normal accident” (Perrow, 1984). They begin by briefly outlining normal accident theory; both Perrow’s original version and Mezias’ (1994) subsequent extension. They then use normal accident theory to analyze the mortgage meltdown and draw a few insights from our account. They then consider the relationship between normal accidents and wrongdoing; a vexing question for both normal accident theory and observers of the meltdown.
The equilibrium magnitude of mispricing can be no greater than the cost of arbitraging it away. Yet, mispricing typically arises when the uncertainty about a firm is high, which is precisely when the stock’s liquidity is low.
A decade before the 1929 stock market crash there was a booming real estate market in New York City that Assistant Professor Anna Scherbina says resembles the housing bubble of the 1990s and 2000s.
In a recent radio interview, Scherbina discussed an index of home prices in Manhattan between 1920 and 1939 that she and Associate Professor Tom Nicholas of the Harvard Business School collected by hand from the Manhattan Public Library archives. This data set is informative because the housing market in Manhattan represented 5% to 10% of all the U.S. real estate wealth at that time.
Professor Paul Griffin and his coauthors David Lont and Yuan Sun of the School of Business, University Otago, Dunedin, recently presented their article “Corporate Governance and Audit Fees: Evidence of Countervailing Relations” at a joint symposium hosted by the Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics and Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory at The Hong Kong Polytechnic University on January 4-5, 2008.
For almost two decades, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), the nation’s largest public pension fund with more than $207 billion in assets, has been active in pursuing corporate reforms. CalPERS is generally credited as a founder of shareholder activism stemming from its heightened proxy voting activity at companies in the mid-1980s.