Corporate Debt Maturity and the Real Effects of the 2007 Credit Crisis*

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Abstract

We use the 2007 credit crisis to gauge the effect of financial contracting on real corporate behavior. We identify heterogeneity in financial contracting at the onset of the crisis by exploiting ex-ante variation in long-term debt maturity structure. Our empirical methodology accounts for observed and unobserved (time-invariant) firm characteristics using a difference-in-differences matching estimator. We find that firms whose long-term debt was largely maturing right after the third quarter of 2007 cut investment by 2.5 percentage points more (on a quarterly basis) than otherwise similar firms whose debt was scheduled to mature well after 2008. This relative decline in investment is statistically and economically significant, representing one-third of pre-crisis investment levels. A number of falsification and placebo tests confirm our inferences. For example, in the absence of a credit shock (“normal times”), the maturity composition of long-term debt has no effect on investment. Likewise, maturity composition has no impact on investment in the crisis for firms for which long-term debt is not a major source of funding. Our analysis highlights the importance of debt maturity for corporate financial policy. More than showing a general association between credit markets and real activity, our analysis shows how that relation operates through a specific feature of financial contracting.

Key words: Financial crisis, debt maturity, matching estimators, investment spending, financing constraints  
JEL classification: G31

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1 Introduction

Does financial contracting have real implications? How do firms respond to shifts in the supply of credit? In this paper, we develop a novel strategy to pin down the effect of financial contracting on real corporate outcomes following a shift in the supply of credit. We do so using the credit crisis (or “panic”) of 2007. This event is unique among other credit shortage episodes in that it originated from problems arising from non-corporate assets: housing mortgages. Gorton (2008) provides a detailed analysis of the various forces leading to the sharp reduction in liquidity that affected financial institutions dealing with subprime-based derivatives starting in late-2007. The lack of transparency on long-term investments of financial institutions, and the possibility that losses on credit derivatives would be passed on to their balance sheets lead to a panic that shut down financing to banks and other institutions (see Acharya et al. (2009)). As we document below, the crisis spilled over into the market for long-term corporate debt in the Fall of 2007, making it hard for firms to refinance their long-term obligations.

The 2007 episode arguably provides for a shock to the supply of external financing that is not caused by the weakening of firm business fundamentals. It is important to disentangle credit supply and demand effects, but exploring a credit shock per se will not ensure the identification of a causal channel between financial contracting and corporate outcomes. In particular, while general credit conditions may exacerbate the relation between variables such as financial leverage and investment, one cannot ascertain whether financial contracting causes firms to behave in a particular way. To establish that channel, one needs to identity a feature of financial contracting whose variation can be considered to be exogenous at the time of the credit shock.

We identify heterogeneity in financial contracting at the onset of the 2007 crisis by exploiting ex-ante variation in long-term debt maturity. In a nutshell, we examine whether firms with large fractions of their long-term debt maturing at the time of the crisis are forced to adjust their behavior (e.g., by cutting capital expenditures) in ways that are more pronounced than otherwise similar firms that need not refinance their long-term debt during the crisis. To the extent that these refinancing effects are large, they show that the terms of financial contracting — in this case, contract maturity — can affect real corporate outcomes.

Let us discuss how our focus on long-term debt maturity works as an identification tool. The literature on debt structure has shown that the choice between short- versus long-term debt is correlated with firm characteristics such as size, profitability, and credit ratings (see, e.g., Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and Opler (1996)). As such, in general, the determination of debt maturity creates difficulties for the identification of unconfounded causal effects of financial contracting on real outcomes. Rather than contrasting short- and long-term debt, we look at the proportion of long-term
debt that matures right after Fall of 2007 to gauge how firms are affected by credit supply shifts. Long-term debt is typically publicly-held and difficult to renegotiate on short notice (see Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)). This makes it hard to argue that firms are at their “debt-maturity targets” at all times.\(^1\) Because cumulative, hard-to-reverse decisions affecting the maturity of a firm’s long-term debt were made many years prior to August 2007, whether the firm was pre-scheduled to refinance a significant portion of its long-term debt right at the onset of the crisis is plausibly exogenous to the firm’s performance following the crisis. We exploit this friction (“maturity-structure discontinuity”) in our analysis, noting that, to our knowledge, none of the papers in the literature has studied the implications of the maturity path of long-term debt contracts.

While we argue that variation in the fraction of long-term debt that comes due right after August of 2007 is likely to be exogenous to firm outcomes over the crisis, one might wonder if other sources of firm heterogeneity could underlie the relations we might observe. To alleviate this concern, we use a difference-in-differences matching estimator approach that incorporates observable firm characteristics and accounts for unobservable, idiosyncratic firm effects. Our overall goal is to design a test in which firm financing status can be seen as a “treatment.” To minimize concerns about selection, we match firms that we expect to be more susceptible to the negative effects of refinancing constraints (i.e., firms that happened to have a large fraction of their long-term debt coming due when the crisis hit) with “control” firms that need not renegotiate their debt (these firms’ long-term debt is due years after the shock). We match these two groups of firms on the basis of their asset size, industry classification, credit ratings, \(Q\), long-term leverage ratio, cash flows, and cash holdings. The matching allow us to compare otherwise similar firms, with the only salient difference being the composition of their long-term debt maturity. The tests we perform further account for time-invariant heterogeneity by comparing within-firm changes in the outcome variables of interest from the period that precedes the 2007 credit shock to the period that follows that shock.\(^2\)

We consider a number of alternatives to our baseline experiment. These alternative tests provide checks for the logic of our approach and further minimize concerns about hard-wiring in our results. For example, we perform a battery of falsification tests that replicate our matching estimator procedure in non-crisis periods. In principle, a firm whose debt matures at a time in which credit is easily available should not display a constrained-type behavior that can be linked to debt maturity. It is only the juxtaposition of firm debt maturity and a credit crisis that should affect investment. In

\(^1\) An extensive literature discusses how firms seem to deviate for years from their desired debt-to-asset ratios. Arguably, the ability to secure an optimal debt-maturity composition would probably be a lower-order concern if firms are unable to secure the overall debt positions they might desire.

\(^2\) We perform these tests using the Abadie and Imbens (2002) matching estimator (discussed below). The same estimator is used by Villalonga (2004), Malmendier and Tate (2009), and Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2009). We also perform similar tests using standard regression analysis later in the paper.
addition, we redefine our treatment and control groups based on the degree to which long-term debt is an important component of firm financing. According to the logic of our strategy, for those firms for which long-term debt is only a small fraction of total financing, we should not see a link between investment spending and the fact that some long-term debt is maturing in the crisis. To further ensure that the assignment of firms into treatment and control groups is exogenous to the post-2007 crisis outcomes, we also perform tests in which we measure maturity structure several years prior to the credit crisis. This allows us to rule out more subtle unobserved heterogeneity stories, such as “smart CEOs” anticipating the August 2007 panic and refinancing (prior to the crisis) the part of their firms’ long-term debt that is scheduled to mature in 2008.

Our findings are as follows. First, we document pronounced cross-sectional variation in the maturity structure of long-term debt at the onset of the 2007 credit crisis. Variation in long-term debt maturity is persistent across time, and we find no evidence that it changed in the years leading up to the 2007 crisis. These results are interesting in their own right and suggest that future researchers may use long-term debt as a source of heterogeneity in firm financial status. Importantly for our strategy, we are able to isolate firms with a large fraction of long-term debt maturing right after the crisis (treated firms) that are virtually identical to other firms whose debt happens to mature in later years (the control group). We show that these two groups of firms are similar across all characteristics we consider, except their long-term debt maturity structure.

We then show that a firm’s debt maturity structure has consequences for post-crisis real outcomes. For firms in the treatment group, quarterly investment rates dropped to 5.7% of capital on average — a fall of 2.1% relative to their pre-crisis level. Firms in the control group hardly changed their spending. The Abadie-Imbens estimate of the difference-in-differences in investment behavior is −2.5% in our baseline experiment. This drop in investment is economically substantive, representing a decline of approximately one-third of pre-crisis investment levels. Confirming the logic of our strategy, the relation between maturity structure and investment disappears when we use firms with insignificant amounts of long-term debt in the experiment. On the flip side, that relation strengthens when we focus on firms for which long-term debt is a more important source of financing (in this case, the relative change in investment is −3.4%). We also find that the effect of maturity structure on investment is robust to many variations in the definitions of treatment and control groups. Moreover, it only holds for the 2007 period. In particular, we replicate our experiment over a number of years and find that maturity structure is unrelated with changes in investment for these non-crisis (placebo) periods.

\[^3\text{Anticipating the details of the experiment, the pre-crisis period is defined as the first three quarters of 2007 and the post-crisis period is defined as the first three quarters of 2008. In the baseline tests, the treatment group contains firms for which the fraction of long-term debt maturing within one year (i.e., in 2008) is greater than 20%; the control group contains firms for which that fraction is lower than 20%. Firms are matched on covariates measured in the pre-crisis period.}\]
A standard concern about inferences from studies using the difference-in-differences estimator in a treatment-effects framework is whether treatment and control group outcomes followed “parallel trends” prior to the treatment — only in this case one can ascribe differences in the post-treatment period to the treatment itself. Another concern is whether alternative “macro effects” that differentially affect treatment and control groups might explain the behaviors we observe in the post-treatment period. Our matching estimator ensures that we are comparing firms from the same industry with very similar characteristics such as credit quality, size, and profitability, suggesting that these firms would behave similarly in the absence of re-financing frictions. Still, we cannot rule out the possibility that there are latent group differences that trigger contrasting behaviors in the post-treatment period because of events — other than our proposed treatment — taking place in that period.

We consider both of these concerns in our analysis. First, we compare pre-treatment trends in the outcomes (changes in investment) of our treatment and control groups. Going back several years prior to 2007, we find no evidence that the investment path of firms in those two groups followed different trends. Second, we examine the concern that the recession that followed the 2007 shock may drive a differential wedge in the post-crisis investment of treatment and control firms, irrespective of the observed credit shortage. To deal with this issue, we look for a period that precedes a recession, but that lacks a sharp credit supply shock to identify a placebo treatment. In other words, we try to eliminate the “credit-supply component” of our treatment strategy, but allow for the same post-treatment macro effect (demand contraction) that could potentially drive our main results. Although it is difficult to find a recession that is not preceded by a credit tightening, we argue that the 2001 recession was not preceded by a credit shortage that is comparable to that of Fall of 2007. This falsification test shows no evidence of a differential recession-driven behavior for our treatment and controls firms.

Naturally, the large effect of maturing debt on investment in 2008 raises the question of whether firms adjusted along other margins to accommodate their financing gap. In particular, firms may have adjusted other real and financial policies, such as drawing down cash balances, reducing inventory stocks, repurchasing fewer shares, and cutting dividends. To provide some evidence on this point, in the last part of the paper, we perform a “back-of-the-envelope” analysis of how the treated firms responded to the crisis. Our calculations suggest that the firms that were burdened with large amounts of maturing debt in 2008 tapped their “least costly” sources of funds. In particular, consistent with Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), we find that the brunt of the shock to external funding was absorbed by firms’ cash balances. Consistent with Fazzari and Petersen (1993), reductions in inventory were also pronounced across treated firms. We end our investigation with analysis of ex-post data showing that firms in our treatment group were indeed unable to refinance their long-term debt maturing in 2008.

There are only a handful of empirical papers looking at the dispersion of corporate debt maturity
Barclay and Smith report that firms that are large and with fewer growth options have more long-term debt in their capital structures. In addition, Guedes and Opler show that large firms with high-quality credit ratings typically borrow on the short and long ends of the maturity spectrum, while firms with poor credit ratings borrow mid-term. These papers do not consider the effect of supply shocks on corporate policies, nor look at variation in long-term debt maturity. Theory has also studied the determinants of maturity structure, suggesting that both low- and high-credit quality firms are likely to borrow short-term, but for different reasons (Diamond (1991, 1993) and Flannery (1986)). High-quality credit firms borrow short-term to signal that they are not concerned with liquidity shocks, while low-quality firms might have no alternatives to bank debt-financing with restrictive covenants. The existing literature highlights the identification problem that we sidestep in this paper. For instance, firms that use short-term bank financing are inherently more likely to be adversely affected by a credit supply shock. As a result, one cannot measure the effect of maturity structure on real outcomes simply by relating the pre-crisis amounts of short- versus long-term debt and post-crisis outcomes.

Similarly to our paper, Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2009) focus on the impact of the credit crisis on corporate investment. Their attempt at identifying firms that are affected by the crisis hinges on firms’ cash and debt positions. While appealing, as discussed above, their proposed strategy is subject to the criticism that firms’ cash and debt policies prior to the crisis may confound factors that explain those firms’ post-crisis behavior. This makes it difficult to ascribe causality going from financial policy to real firm outcomes. Related papers that do not look at the current crisis are Chava and Purnanandam (2008) and Lemmon and Roberts (2009) (see also Leary (2009)). Chava and Purnanandam (2008) examine the effects of the 1998 Brazil-Russia-LTCM crisis on corporate valuation. The authors find a larger valuation impact upon bank-dependent firms whose main banks had greater exposure to Russia. Lemmon and Roberts examine the effects of a contraction in the supply of risky credit (junk bonds) caused by changes in regulation and the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert. Their evidence suggests that risky firms’ leverage remained constant while their investment declined as a result of changes in the junk-bond market landscape. Our study differs from these papers in that our strategy dispenses with the need to focus on (more marginal) bank-dependent or risky firms to assess the impact of credit supply shocks. In addition, we uniquely pin point a feature of financial contracting that transmits the impact of credit shocks onto firm investment.

Our study contains important implications for corporate financial policy. Our results imply, for example, that firms with similar debt-to-asset ratios may respond very differently to a credit supply shock. Indeed, firms with relatively low debt ratios can be more affected by such shocks, depending on the maturity composition of their debt. This suggests additional caution when sorting firms based on
their observed leverage ratios as a way to gauge their response to macroeconomic events. Our study
is new in highlighting the extra attention corporate managers should pay to the maturity profile of
their firms’ debt. Debt maturity is a key aspect of financial flexibility, an aspect that, according to our
evidence, becomes particularly important during credit contractions. Finally, our study is one of only
a handful of papers that use well-identified elements of financial contracting to show how financial
contracts affect firm behavior (see also Chava and Roberts (2008)).

The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. We discuss our empirical strategy in Section
2. Our baseline result that the financial contracting (debt maturity structure) affects real corporate
outcomes is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we conduct a number of additional tests designed to
check the robustness of our results. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2 Empirical Design

We start this section by describing our basic experimental design and the matching estimator method-
ology we employ in the paper. We then describe the data used in our tests.

2.1 The “Experiment”

Our basic insight is that of exploiting variation in long-term debt maturity at the onset of the 2007
crisis as a way to identify the effect of credit supply shocks on corporate policies. Of course, the rele-
vant question is how the composition of long-term debt maturity would affect real corporate policies.
In a frictionless capital markets, debt maturity is irrelevant because firms can always refinance and
recontract their way around the potential effects of a balloon debt payment. What is special about
credit crises is that financial markets are arguably less than frictionless during those times. The 2007
crisis, in particular, affected traditional modes of corporate financing, such as commercial paper, bond
placements, bank loans, and secondary equity issuance. In such an environment, soon-to-mature debt
can effectively reduce corporate investment, as firms find it difficult to substitute across alternative
funding sources while at the same time trying to avoid defaulting on their debt payments. As a result,
firms that were “unfortunate” to have large chunks of debt maturing around the 2007 crisis may be
expected to face tighter financing constraints than firms that do not have to finance balloon debt
payments during that same period.

2.1.1 The 2007 Credit Supply Shock

As discussed by Gorton (2008) and Acharya, Philippon, Richardson, and Roubini (2009), the current
crisis probably started with a reversal in housing prices in 2006, which in turn triggered a wave of
default of subprime mortgages going into 2007. The increase in subprime defaults in the first half of
2007 initially affected financial institutions that had invested heavily in asset-backed securities (ABS). Acharya et al. identify the collapse of two Bear Sterns-managed hedge funds in June 2007 as a “salient” milepost of the systemic crisis. These hedge funds and other special investment vehicles (e.g., bank SIVs) relied on short-term rollover debt to finance holdings of long-term assets. By early August 2007, it was clear that investors were no longer willing to rollover short-term financing to highly-levered institutions, as exemplified by the run on BNP Paribas’ SIVs. Similar runs were observed across many countries and markets in subsequent weeks. They were largely attributed to the perceived lack of transparency of the investment portfolios of financial institutions, and the possibility that large losses would be passed on to the balance sheet of banks that sponsored investment vehicles such as SIVs.

As a result of these developments, the spreads on short-term financing instruments reached historically high levels. This is illustrated by the time series of the 3-month LIBOR and commercial paper spreads over comparable-maturity treasuries. These series are plotted in Figure 1. There is a sharp, large shock to both of these spreads around August 2007. Spreads go up from levels lower than 0.5% between 2001 and the Summer of 2007, to levels between 1% and 2% following August 2007. In particular, in July 2007 the average 3-month LIBOR spread was 0.5%. The LIBOR spread jumped to 1.3% in the month of August, staying above 1% in the subsequent months.

The repricing of credit instruments that followed by the 2007 panic quickly went beyond short-term bank financing, spilling over into longer-term instruments. The episode highlighted the interdependence of segments of the financial markets that were once thought of as being isolated from each other. The lack of availability of short-term financing is believed to have softened the demand for long-term bonds by institutions such as hedge funds and insurance companies. The collapse of the “repo” market further affected the demand for highly-rated corporate bonds, which were used as collateral for borrowing agreements during “normal times.” Current research on the crisis (and anecdotal evidence) suggests that these developments led spreads on long-term corporate bonds to increase sharply. In Figure 2, we report the time series of spreads for indices of investment grade and high yield bonds (from Citigroup’s Yieldbook). Citigroup reports average duration and maturity for the bond portfolios used in the construction of these indices. Given the reported durations, which hover between 4 and 7 years, we choose the 5-year treasury rate as a benchmark to calculate spreads. We note that the average credit quality of Citigroup’s investment-grade and high-yield indices is, respectively, A and B+. Thus, Figure 2 gives

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Footnotes:

1 See also Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2009) for a model of rollover risk that generates market freezes like the one observed in August 2007.

2 We use Citigroup’s BIG_CORP (investment-grade) and HY_MARKET (high-yield) indices. Almeida and Philippon (2007) also use Yieldbook data to calculate corporate bond spreads by rating level.
a fairly complete picture of the effect of the crisis on the spreads of bonds with different credit quality.

**Figure 2 About Here**

The spreads on long-term corporate bonds show a dramatic increase starting in August 2007, both for investment-grade and junk-rated firms. The figure shows that August 2007 represents a turning point for corporate bond spreads. Investment-grade spreads had been close to 1% since 2004. These spreads increased sharply to 1.6% in August of 2007, and towards levels that approached 3% during early 2008. Junk bond spreads display a similar pattern, increasing from levels around 3% in early 2007 to 4.6% in August, and then to between 7% and 8% in early 2008.

Similar signs of a credit squeeze in the U.S. bond markets can be gathered from quantity data. According to SDC’s *New Issues Database*, the total debt issuance with maturity greater than one year for the third quarter of 2007 amounted to $63 billion. There were a total of 165 deals registered in that quarter. To put these numbers in perspective, the average quarterly amount of funds raised in the bond market in the two years preceding the crisis was $337 billion, while the average number of deals was 1,476.

At the same time that firms found it difficult to raise funds in the bond markets, banks were also cutting the loan supply. New commercial and industrial loans extended by U.S. commercial banks dropped from $54 billion in February 2007 to about $44 billion in February 2008 (cf. Federal Reserve’s *Survey of Terms of Business Lending*). Loans under commitment (lines of credit) dropped from $41 billion to $37 billion during the same period. Results from a recent study by Ivashina and Scharfstein (2009) are also consistent with a significant drop in the supply of new debt as a result of the financial crisis. The authors use Reuters’ *LPC-DealScan* data to show that new loans to large borrowers fell by 79% from the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007) to the end of 2008. Lending for real investment and restructuring (LBOs, M&A, share repurchases) show similarly large drops during the crisis period.

The existing evidence supports our conjecture that there was a substantial increase in the cost of short- and long-term financing for firms as well as a fall in the quantity of credit available for firms starting in August 2007. These movements appear to be largely due to events that were initially associated with the housing sector and eventually affected financial institutions and the overall credit markets. Such an environment provides us with a unique opportunity to identify the effects of supply contractions on corporate policies. Notably, this is different from the subsequent (deeper) contraction that took place around the Lehman debacle in Fall of 2008. At that time, the entire economy was in a deep recessionary state, making it harder to separate the effects of credit supply and demand.

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6 The spreads we present are very similar to the high-yield bond spreads reported in Figure P.2 in Acharya et al. (2009).

7 Clearly, the Lehman crisis in the Fall of 2008 had an additional negative impact on bond spreads, which shot up momentarily to levels close to 7% for investment-grade bonds, and above 15% for high-yield bonds.
The Maturity Structure of Corporate Long-Term Debt

Our identification strategy requires that there is enough variation in long-term debt maturity across firms. In particular, there must exist a significant group of firms that have a spike (“discontinuity”) in their long-term debt maturity structure appearing right after the crisis. Naturally, one could expect firms to have well-diversified maturity structures, so that they are never forced to repay or refinance significant amounts of debt in any particular year. If that was the case, it would be difficult for us to implement our proposed strategy. As discussed in the introduction, and elsewhere in the literature, there seems to exist a number of first-order frictions making it difficult for firms to maintain their optimal capital structures (assuming firms do pursue such policies in the first place).\(^8\) It would be hard to imagine that firms are generally unable to be at their optimal debt-to-asset ratios for many consecutive years, while at the same time maintaining an optimal debt maturity structure. The existing literature provides limited guidance on this conjecture. Hence, we find it interesting to investigate this in more detail.

Figure 3 depicts the distribution of debt maturities for the sample of firms that we use in our analysis (the data are described in detail in Section 2.3), calculated at the onset of the 2007 crisis. For each firm, we have information on the amount of long-term debt that matures in each of the following five years: 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012.\(^9\) Figure 3 reports these amounts as a fraction of total long-term debt. If maturity structure was well diversified, we would expect this distribution to have a large mass around a specific value.\(^10\) The figure makes it clear, however, that there is significant cross-firm variation in maturity structure. Consider, for example, the fraction of long-term debt that is due in one year (i.e., in 2008). Figure 3 suggests that there exists a significant number of firms whose long-term debt maturity concentrates in the year of 2008. At the same time, many firms do not have any significant amount of long-term debt maturing in 2008. Similar variation in maturities obtains for the other individual years. For example, there are many firms with maturity spikes occurring in 2012. These firms are similar to the ones with concentrated maturity in 2008, in that they, too, allow their debt maturity to concentrate in a particular year; however, their maturity is concentrated in a future year that lies far beyond the 2007 crisis.

Two other features of the distribution of debt maturity measured at the end of 2007 are noteworthy.

\(^8\)Starting from Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), researchers cite transactions costs arguments as a key reason why firms may not instantaneously adjust their debt ratios (see also Strebulaev (2007)). Alternative explanations include managerial “market timing” (Baker and Wurgler (2002)) and simple inertia (Welch (2004)).

\(^9\)We also know the amount of long-term debt that matures in more than five years (starting in 2013), though we do not have year-by-year information beyond five years.

\(^10\)For example, if firms regularly issued 10-year bonds we would expect to see a mass at the value of 10% in every year.
(and useful for our test design). First, the distributions of long-term debt maturing in the individual
years beyond 2008 (2009 through 2012) look fairly similar to the distribution of long-term debt ma-
turing in 2008. This suggests that firms may not always try to renegotiate in advance and elongate
maturities of debts that are soon to come due. Second, as depicted in Figure 4, the distributions of
the long-term debt maturity of firms for years prior to 2007 are strikingly similar to that of 2007. In
other words, there is no evidence of changes in long-term debt maturity structure in the years leading
up to the 2007 crisis.

\textbf{Figure 4 About Here}

One possible reason why some firms end up with spikes in their debt maturity distributions (such
as those depicted in Figures 3 and 4) is that they may concentrate debt issuance in particular years. To
provide some descriptive evidence on these patterns, we use the Herfindahl index, a common measure
of concentration. From the sample of 1,067 firms that we use in our main analysis, we select those
whose long-term debt issuance variable (defined in detail below) is available for the last ten years;
that is, from 1998 through 2007. A Herfindahl index is then calculated using the percentage of debt
(normalized by assets) that the firm issued in a particular year with respect to the total issuance within
the entire 10-year window. If firms perfectly diversify their debt issuance over this 10-year window,
we would see a Herfindahl index of 0.10. As it turns out, the average Herfindahl index calculated from
our sample is 0.34, suggesting that on average firms issue debt in about 3 of 10 years.

2.2 Matching Estimators

The use of matching estimators is a salient feature of our empirical strategy and it is important to
discuss how we employ this technique. We want to test whether firms that need to refinance their
long-term obligations at the time of a credit crisis alter decisions related to real-side variables. Our
goal is to develop an identification strategy that resembles an “experiment:” the firm’s long-term debt
maturity structure and developments in the financial markets coincide such that the firm needs to re-
finance a large fraction of its debt in the midst of a credit contraction. If debt maturity was randomly
assigned across firms, then it would suffice to compare the outcomes of firms that had significant debt
maturing around the time of the crisis with those whose debt happened to mature at a later date.
Our analysis, however, needs to account for the fact that we are not doing an experiment, but instead
relying on observational data.

The challenge is to gauge firms’ outcomes \textit{had they not} been caught between a credit crisis and
the need to refinance their debt. One then needs to estimate the differences between counterfactual
outcomes and those that are observed. One way to tackle this problem is to use a parametric regression
approach, where the group of interest is differentiated from other observations with a dummy variable. Under this standard approach, outcome differences are estimated by the coefficient on the group dummy. The regression model is specified according to a set of theoretical priors about the outcome variable — a simple, linear representation of a particular theory. Controls such as size, profitability, and leverage may be added to the specification to capture additional sources of firm heterogeneity. If left unmodeled, that sort of variation could jeopardize the estimation as it may explain both a firm’s selection into the group of interest and its observed outcome. Importantly, the inclusion of control variables in the regression per se does not address the fact that the groups being compared may have very different characteristics (e.g., comparison groups with markedly different size and profitability distributions). This is particularly concerning for applications in which a poor distributional overlap might yield an ineffective set of controls. In addition, the regression approach may place undue weight on linear model parameterization in the estimation process (counterfactuals will be created via linear projections based on the variables in the model).\textsuperscript{11} Depending on the application, one can improve the estimation of group differences by allowing for non-linear modeling as well as using non-parametric methods.

The test strategy that we emphasize in our study is less parametric and more closely related to the notion of an experiment. Our tests are conducted with the use of matching estimators.\textsuperscript{12} The idea behind this family of estimators is that of isolating treated observations (in our application, firms with debt maturing during the crisis) and then, from the population of non-treated observations, look for control observations that best “match” the treated ones in multiple dimensions (covariates). In this framework, the set of counterfactuals are restricted to the matched controls. In other words, it is assumed that in the absence of the treatment, the treated group would have behaved as the control group actually did. The matches are made so as to ensure that treated and control observations have identical distributions along each and every one of the covariates chosen (dimensions such as firm size, profitability, leverage, credit risk, etc.). Inferences about the treatment of interest (re-financing constraints) are based on comparisons of the ex-post outcomes of treatment and control groups.\textsuperscript{13}

Although a number of matching estimators are available, we employ the Abadie and Imbens (2002) estimator.\textsuperscript{14} The Abadie-Imbens (“full covariate”) estimator allows one to match a treated firm with a control firm, with matching being made with respect to both categorical and continuous variables. The estimator aims at producing “exact” matches on categorical variables. Naturally, the matches on continuous variables will not be exact (though they should be close). The procedure recognizes this

\textsuperscript{11}A formal discussion is provided in Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) (see also Dehejia and Wahba (2002)).

\textsuperscript{12}For robustness, we also run standard regressions (see Section 4.6). Those regressions confirm our central findings.

\textsuperscript{13}In the treatment evaluation literature this difference is referred to as the average treatment effect for the treated, or ATT (see Imbens (2004) for a review).

\textsuperscript{14}In particular, we use the bias-corrected, heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator implemented in Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2004).
difficulty and applies a “bias-correction” component to the estimates of interest.

In matching estimations, the specification used is less centered around the idea of representing a model that explains the outcome variable. Instead, the focus is in ensuring that variables that might both influence the selection into treatment and observed outcomes are appropriately accounted for in the estimation. For example, the outcome that we are most interested in is investment spending. While there are numerous theories on the determinants of corporate investment, we only include in our test covariates for which one could make a reasonable case for simultaneity in the treatment–outcome relation. Among the list of categorical variables we include in our estimations are the firm’s industrial classification and the rating of its public bonds. Our non-categorical variables include the firm’s market-to-book ratio (or “Q”), cash flow, cash holdings, size, and the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. It is commonly accepted that those covariates capture a lot of otherwise unobserved firm heterogeneity. By virtue of the full-covariate matching approach, our estimations account for all variable interactions.

Lastly, we note that we model the outcomes in our experiments in a differenced form — we perform difference-in-differences estimations. Specifically, rather than comparing the levels of investment of the treatment and control groups, we compare the changes in investment across the groups after the treatment. We do so because the investment levels of the treated and controls could be different prior to the event defining the experiment, and continue to be different after that event, in which case our inferences could be potentially biased by these uncontrolled firm-specific differences.

2.3 Data Collection and Variable Construction

We use data from COMPUSTAT’s North America Fundamentals Annual, Fundamentals Quarterly, and Ratings files. We start from the quarterly file and disregard observations from financial institutions (SICs 6000–6999), not-for-profit organizations and governmental enterprises (SICs greater than 8000), as well as ADRs. We drop firms with missing or negative values for total assets (atq), capital expenditures (capxy), property, plant and equipment (ppentq), cash holdings (cheq), or sales (saleq). We also drop firms for which cash holdings, capital expenditures or property, plant and equipment are larger than total assets.

Our data selection criteria and variable construction approach follows that of Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), who study the effect of financing constraints on the management of internal funds, and that of Frank and Goyal (2003), who look at external financing decisions. Similar to Almeida et al., we discard from the raw data those observations for which the value of total assets is less than $10 million, and those displaying asset growth exceeding 100% (including firm-quarters with missing values). We further require that firms’ quarterly sales be positive and that the sales growth does not exceed 100%.
The data on debt maturity variables are only available in the COMPUSTAT annual file. We merge the annual and the quarterly files to make use of debt maturity information in our tests. COMPUSTAT annual items \(dd1\), \(dd2\), \(dd3\), \(dd4\), and \(dd5\) represent, respectively, the dollar amount of long-term debt maturing during the first year after the annual report (long-term debt maturing in 2008 for firms with a December 2007 fiscal year-end), during the second year after the report (long-term debt maturing in 2009 for firms with a December 2007 fiscal year-end), during the third year after the report, and so on. COMPUSTAT annual item \(dltt\) represents the dollar amount of long-term debt that matures in more than one year. Accordingly, a firm’s total long-term debt can be calculated as \(dd1 + dltt\).

We apply the following filters to the debt variables. We delete firms with total long-term debt \((dd1 + dltt)\) greater than assets \((at)\) in the annual file and firms for which the data on debt maturity appears inconsistent. By inconsistent we mean the following. Some firm show values of debt maturing in more than one year \((dltt)\) that are lower than the sum of debt maturing in two, three, four, and five years \((dd2 + dd3 + dd4 + dd5)\), while others have debt maturing in one year \((dd1)\) greater than the sum of \(dd1\) and \(dltt\). These observations are deleted from the sample. For our baseline tests, we disregard firms for which liabilities such as notes payables, bank overdrafts, and loans payable to officers and stockholders (item \(np\) in the annual file) are greater than 1% of total assets. In our baseline tests, we require firms to have long-term debt maturing beyond one year \((dltt)\) that represents at least 5% of assets \((at)\). These debt-related restrictions help assure that the results in our paper do not come from comparisons between “low-quality” firms that need to rely on very short-term obligations with “high-quality” firms that can issue long-term debt.

We focus on firms that have 2007 fiscal year-end months in September, October, November, December, or January. The sample of firms with these fiscal year-end months corresponds to more than 80% of the universe of firms in fiscal year 2007. This restriction is due to the timing of the credit shock, which happened in the Fall of 2007. For our benchmark tests, we want to avoid firms that filed their 2007 annual report before the crisis. These firms could have used the time period between filing the annual report and the credit crisis to rebalance their debt maturity, thus compromising our identification strategy. The variables that detail the amount of long-term debt maturing within one, two, three, four, and five years from the date of the report are only available in the annual COMPUSTAT file. Accordingly, for a December fiscal-year-end firm, we cannot use the third quarter report to obtain a breakdown of timing of the debt maturity composition as of 9/30/2007, we instead use the firm’s 2007 annual report to obtain the debt-maturity breakdown as of 12/31/2007. Finally, to make it into our final sample, a firm needs to have non-missing values for all variables that are used in our estimations, including all covariates and the outcome variable. Our final 2007 sample consists of 1,067 individual firms.

In our basic experiment, the outcome variable is the change in the average quarterly investment
over the first three quarters of 2008 relative to the first three quarters of 2007.\textsuperscript{15} Investment is defined as the ratio of quarterly capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT’s \textit{capxy}) to the lag of quarterly property, plant and equipment (\textit{ppentq}). As discussed earlier, we match firms based on \textit{Q}, cash flow, size, cash holdings, and long-term leverage. \textit{Q} is defined as the ratio of total assets plus market capitalization minus common equity minus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (\textit{atq + prccq x cshoq – ceqq – txditcq}) to total assets (\textit{atq}). Cash flow is defined as the ratio of net income plus depreciation and amortization (\textit{ibq + dpq}) to the lag of quarterly property, plant and equipment. Size is defined as the log of total assets. Cash holdings is the ratio of cash and short-term investments (\textit{cheq}) to total assets. Long-term leverage is the ratio of total long-term debt (\textit{dd1 + dltt}) to total assets. Our matching estimator uses the averages of the first three quarters of 2007 of each of these variables as covariates.

We also match firms on industry and credit ratings categories. Industry categories are given by firms’ two-digit SIC codes. Our credit ratings categories follow the index system used by S&P and are defined as: investment grade rating (COMPUSTAT’s \textit{splticrm} from AAA to BBB–), speculative rating (\textit{splticrm} from SD to BB+), and unrated (\textit{splticrm} is missing). Matching treatment and control firms within the same industry \textit{and} within the same debt ratings categories ensures that differences in firms’ underlying business conditions (e.g., product demand) and credit quality may not explain our results.

We construct treatment and control groups based on firms’ long-term debt maturity schedule. In our benchmark specification, the treatment variable is defined by the ratio of long-term debt maturing within one year (\textit{dd1}) to total long-term debt (\textit{dd1 + dltt}). Firms for which this ratio is greater than 20\% are assigned to the treatment group, while firms for which this ratio is less than 20\% are assigned to the non-treated group.\textsuperscript{16} Our base procedure assigns 86 firms to the treatment group. While we provide a full characterization of the treatment and control firms in Section 3.1, it might be useful to describe a few concrete examples of firms in our sample. We do this in turn.

\section*{2.4 Examples of Treatment and Control Firms}

One of the firms in our treatment group comes from the car rental business: Dollar-Thrifty. In the Fall of 2007, Dollar’s fraction of total long-term debt maturing in 2008 was 34\%. The fraction of long-term debt maturing between in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, was, respectively, 0\%, 19\%, 19\%, and 19\%; the remainder 8\% was due in five years or more. It is apparent that Dollar’s long-term maturity schedule happened to have a “discontinuity” right at the time of the crisis.

Our sample match for Dollar is Avis-Budget. The two firms are in the same industry, have about the same size, and are both high-yield bond issuers. However, Avis’s long-term debt maturity struc-

\textsuperscript{15}We use symmetric quarters around the fourth quarter of 2007 to avoid seasonality effects.

\textsuperscript{16}We later experiment with multiple alternative definitions of treatment and control groups.
ture was different from Dollar’s at the end of 2007. In particular, Avis had to refinance less than 1% of its debt in 2008. In the subsequent four one-year windows (starting from 2009), it would have to repay 7%, 17%, 11%, and 26% of its long-term debt; with 39% due in later years.

Another example of a treated firm in our sample comes from the trucking industry. In the Fall of 2007, JB Hunt’s long-term maturity profile was such that 26% of its debt was due in 2008. By comparison, Con-way was scheduled to refinance only 2% of its long-term debt in 2008 (but over 20% in 2010). JB Hunt and Con-way are investment-grade bond issuers and both these firms enter our sample: Con-way appears as JB Hunt’s control match.

A much-publicized case of crisis-related debt burden is also in our sample: Saks Inc. In late 2007, Saks had 56% of its long-term debt coming due in 2008. Our control match for Saks is Bon-Ton Inc. (who operates, among others, Bergner’s and Belk stores). Bon-Ton’s long-term debt due in one year was less that 1% of the total (but 28% of its debt was scheduled to come due in 2011).17 Another example comes from the communications industry, where Dish Network is a treated firm and Equinix its control match.

3 Results

We start by providing summary statistics for our samples of treated, non-treated, and control firms. Our initial goal is to show that our procedure does a good job of matching treatment to control firms along observable dimensions. We then present our baseline empirical results.

3.1 Summary Statistics

Our matching approach is non-parametric, making it fairly robust to extreme observations. Treatment and control firm outcomes, however, are compared in terms of mean differences. To minimize the impact of gross outliers on these comparisons, we winsorize variables at the 0.5 percentile. Table 1 reports the (pre-crisis) median values of the variables used in our matching procedure across various data groups. We use the continuity-corrected Pearson $\chi^2$ statistic to test for differences in the medians of the variables of interest across the groups.

Panel A compares the 86 treated firms in our sample with the remaining 981 firms that are not assigned into the treated group. The treated firms have higher median $Q$, cash flows, and cash holdings. Treated firms are also smaller and have a lower median leverage ratio. As discussed above, these sample differences are expected, given that we are relying on observational data rather than running a true experiment. The goal of matching estimator techniques is to control for these distributional

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17A portion of Bon-Ton’s operations (a number of retail chains) was bought from Saks just a few years before the crisis. These two firms thus shared a number of similarities in Fall of 2007, except the maturity structure of their long-term debt.
differences, which could affect both the selection into the treatment and the post-crisis outcomes.

Table 1 About Here

Panel B compares median values for treated and matched control firms. The Abadie-Imbens estimator identifies a match for each firm in the treatment group (thus, we have 86 firms in both the treated and control groups). Remarkably, there are no statistical differences in the median values of the covariates we consider across treated and control firms.

Table 2 compares the entire distributions — rather than just the medians — of the various matching covariates across the three groups. The results mirror those reported in Table 1. Panel A shows that treated firms differ significantly from non-treated firms. In particular, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of distributional differences returns highly significant statistics for virtually all of the matching covariates. As in Table 1, these differences disappear when we compare the treated firms to the group of closely-matched control firms. In particular, Panel B of Table 2 shows that there are no statistical differences in the distributions of the various matching covariates across the treated and control firms. These statistics support the assertion that the matching estimator moves our experiment closer to a test in which treatment and control groups differ only with respect to when their long-term debt happens to mature.

Table 2 About Here

3.2 The Real Effects of the 2007 Credit Crisis

We examine the investment behavior of our treated and matched control firms around the 2007 credit crisis. Before doing so, however, we perform a group-mean comparison between the 86 treated firms and the broader set of 981 firms that we classify as non-treated. Note that these comparisons are equivalent to a standard OLS in which the outcome of interest (investment changes) is regressed on a dummy for treated firms. Panel A of Table 3 shows that prior to the crisis, both the treated and non-treated firms were investing at different rates. The average investment-to-capital ratio in the three first quarters of 2007 (the pre-crisis period) is 7.8% for the treated firms and 6.5% for the non-treated firms, though the difference is not statistically significant as indicated in the third row of the panel. The fact that both groups of firms had different investment levels in the pre-crisis period suggests that comparisons between the two groups could be potentially confounded by other factors.

Table 3 About Here

Panel A of Table 3 also shows the investment levels in the first three quarters of 2008 (the post-crisis period). Notice that the investment of the treated and non-treated firms fell in 2008. For firms in
the treatment group, the average investment dropped to 5.7% of capital (a fall of 2.1%). In contrast, for non-treated firms, investment fell to 6.0% (a fall of 0.6%). These figures suggest that investment decreased by 1.6% more for firms that happened to have a lot of long-term debt maturing right after the credit crisis hit, relative to the “general population” of firms whose long-term debt did not come due so soon.

Panel B of Table 3 presents a full-fledged implementation of our difference-in-differences matching estimator. Firms in the treatment groups are now compared with closer counterfactuals (matched controls). Not surprisingly, we see that the 2007 (pre-crisis) investment levels of treatment and control firms are economically similar and statistically indistinguishable. Results in Panel B show that the investment policies of the treated and control firms became significantly different after the crisis. While the average quarterly investment of firms in the treatment group fell by 2.1%, control firms’ investment remained largely unchanged. The estimates imply that investment decreased by 2.2% more for firms that had a lot of long-term debt maturing right after the crisis, relative to otherwise similar firms whose long-term debt did not come due as soon.

One interesting observation about the figures in Panel B is that the investment of the control firms did not fall in 2008. The characteristics of the treated firms may explain why the of the control firms does not decline following the crisis. Notice that firms in the treatment group have greater cash holdings, higher cash flows, and lower leverage ratios than those in the general, non-treated sample population (see Table 1). By construction, firms in the control group will then also have greater cash holdings, higher cash flows, and lower leverage than the average sample firm. Given that they did not have to refinance significant amounts of debt following the crisis, control firms could use their more liquid positions to support investment going into 2008. In other words, corporate investment falls only for the group of high-cash holdings, high-cash flows, low-leverage firms that happen to have long-term debt repayment spikes appearing in 2008 (treated firms).

Panel B also reports the differential change in investment that is produced by the Abadie-Imbens matching estimator (ATT). The ATT difference is equal to –2.5%. This is a central result of our paper. It indicates that investment for the treated firms during the first three quarters of 2008 fell by about one-third of their pre-crisis investment levels. More generally, the estimates in Panel B imply that frictions that arose from firms’ debt maturity structures generated financing constraints the led to lower corporate investment rates following the 2007 credit crisis. These findings highlight the impor-

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18 That estimate would equal –2.2% (the simple average difference effect) if it were not for the “bias-correction” that is embedded in the estimator that helps dealing with the problem of matching on continuous variables (see Section 2.2).

19 To ensure that our ATT results are not explained by extreme data points, we redo our experiment 85 times taking away one treated firm at a time. The lowest ATT estimate is –2.1% (significant at 5% test level) and the highest –2.9% (significant at 1%).

17
tance of debt maturity structure for corporate managers. They are also interesting for economic policymakers when designing policies aimed at softening the impact of credit contractions on the economy.

Given the similarity between firms in the treatment and control groups, the evidence presented is indicative of a causal effect of debt maturity on investment. In order to strengthen the interpretation of the results, we replicate exactly the same “experiment” that we run for the crisis period around a placebo period dated one-year earlier. That is, we use 2006 maturity information to sort firms into treatment and non-treated groups and 2006 covariates to produce a matched group of firms. We then examine firms’ investment behavior during the first three quarters of 2007. This falsification test can help us rule out alternative explanations for the results reported in Panel B. For example, there could be unobservable characteristics that generally predict both a short-maturity profile for long-term debt and a drop in investment (characteristics that are not captured by the matching estimator procedure described in Section 2.2). If this is the case, then maturity structure and investment should be correlated in 2006 as well, and not just in the 2007 crisis period.

The results from this placebo test are reported in Panel C of Table 3. As in Panel B, treated and control firms have virtually identical investment behavior in 2006. Firms with more than 20% of their long-term debt maturing in 2007 (the “treatment” group) display an investment rate of 7.3% in the first three quarters of 2006, while their control counterparts’ investment rate is 7.2%. Notably, there is no difference in investment behavior across these two groups of firms in the post-“treatment” period (first three quarters of 2007), despite the different maturity profiles of long-term debt: both groups invest 6.9% on average in the first three quarters of 2007. The average treatment effect (ATT) in this case is virtually zero, and statistically insignificant. Simply put, our treatment–control contrasts do not appear in 2006.

4 Extensions and Robustness Tests

In this section, we test additional implications of our basic argument, provide evidence that the benchmark results are robust to variations in the empirical specification we use, and show that the 2007 crisis results (reported in Table 3) do not obtain in non-crisis periods. We also show that our results cannot be ascribed to differential trends in the outcome of interest (investment rates), nor can they be attributed to differential responses across treated and control firms that could arise in recession periods (independently of the credit shortage). In addition, we report the results obtained when we use standard regression in our baseline tests. Finally, we provide a “back-of-the-envelope” calculation that shows how firms with balloon debt payments in 2008 responded to the credit crisis along other dimensions besides investment policy.
4.1 Evidence from Non-Crisis Periods

Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that firms with maturing long-term debt find it difficult to refinance their obligations by tapping other external financing sources. The 2007 credit crisis provides us with an ideal setting in which this assumption is likely to hold. By the same token, the assumption is unlikely to hold in periods of easier credit. If our identification strategy is correct, we would expect not to find similar effects of maturity structure on investment during non-crisis periods. Panel C of Table 3 verifies whether this is true for the year of 2006 (one year before the August 2007 credit event). Here, we generalize these placebo tests across years prior to 2006, reporting results on a year-by-year basis as well as pooled over the pre-crisis 2002–2006 period.\textsuperscript{20} To replicate our testing strategy for years prior to 2006, we sort firms into treatment and non-treatment groups considering maturity structures measured in 2001 through 2005, as if there were credit crises in the fourth quarter of each of those years. We then examine the differential change in investment for treated and control firms. We perform this test for each individual non-crisis year, using the exact same sampling criteria, covariate matching approach, and definitions of treatment and control groups that we used for the credit crisis period.

The results are reported in Table 4, which also reports the results for 2006 and 2007 for reference. The estimated difference in investment changes across treatment and control groups is economically small and statistically insignificant for placebo crises in all years between 2001 and 2006. The pooled ATT estimate from 2001 through 2006 is 0.0%. These findings are internally consistent and support our assertion that debt maturity affects investment through a (re-)financing constraint channel in the aftermath of a credit supply contraction.

| Table 4 About Here |

4.2 Parallel Trends and Macro Effects

4.2.1 Parallel Trends

A concern about inferences from studies using the treatment-effects framework is whether the data processes generating the treatment and control group outcomes followed “common or parallel trends” prior to the treatment. Differences in the post-treatment period can only be ascribed to the treatment when this assumption holds. The outcome variable of our study is the within-firm change in investment spending. Recall, our matching procure rendered treatment and control matches with very similar investment going back three quarters prior to the crisis (see Tables 1 and 2). The threat is that although quarterly investment levels might be similar for the two groups of firms for about a

\textsuperscript{20}We start in the early 2000’s because it is difficult to classify the late 1990’s as a non-crisis period in light of episodes such as the LTCM debacle and the Asian crisis. In addition, we later focus separately on the year 2001 because it contains a recession, but not a credit crisis.
year prior to 2008, those firms’ investments could be following different long-term trends in the period leading up to the crisis. The best way to address this concern is to look at data associated with the outcome variable (changes in investment) going farther back in time.

Table 5 reports the mean and median quarterly change in investment for firms in the treatment and control groups going back up to ten years prior to the fourth quarter of 2007. The first row in the table reports statistics for changes in investment going back two years prior to the 2007 crisis quarter (quarterly investment changes from 2005Q3 through 2007Q3). Similar statistics are reported in the second row of the table, where the data go back three years (2004Q3 through 2007Q3). Subsequent rows go back farther in time. The table also reports p-values associated with test statistics for differences in means (standard t-test) and in medians (continuity-correct Pearson’s χ²) across groups.

Table 5 About Here

It is apparent from the estimates reported in Table 5, in particular from the p-values for t- and Pearson-tests, that our experiment’s outcome variable was indistinguishable across treatment and control firms going back as far as ten years prior to the fourth quarter of 2007. It is difficult to make the case that the investment processes of firms in those two groups were following very different trends before the credit shock.

4.2.2 Macro Effects

Another potential concern regarding our difference-in-differences approach is whether other “macro effects” affecting both treatment and control firms might explain the differential behavior we observe in the post-treatment period (irrespective of any effects arising from differences in debt-maturity composition). This concern is valid when one has reasons to believe that there are important, latent differences between treatment and control firms and these differences trigger sharp treatment–control contrasts in the post-treatment period because of other changes in the environment.

Like previous papers examining the consequences of a credit crisis, our post-treatment period encompasses a recession, a time when corporate demand for investment generally declines. The advantage of our strategy over other comparable studies is that it does not rely on firm policies (e.g., leverage, size, or cash holdings) that are inherently linked to factors that can drive differential behavior over the business cycle. For instance, it would not be surprising to see high-leverage/low-cash firms performing particularly poorly during the recession that followed the 2007 crisis if confounding heterogeneity in firm quality (related to profitability, risk, access to capital, etc.) was not properly accounted for. Regarding our strategy, in contrast, it is difficult to articulate an argument for a systematic association between the maturity structure of long-term obligations and firm quality. While the existing literature
provides no evidence of such links, we design an additional test that speaks to this concern.

We argue that the combination of a credit supply shock with maturing debt may have pronounced effects on corporate spending. The concern, however, is that the ensuing recession may somehow drive a differential wedge in the post-crisis investment behaviors of treatment and control firms, a difference that could explain our findings. To examine this argument, we look for a period that precedes a recession, but that lacks a credit supply shock to identify a placebo treatment. In other words, we eliminate one of the key elements of our treatment strategy (credit shortage), but allow for the same macro effects (demand contraction) that could drive our 2007 findings to see if similar treatment–control contrasts emerge. If they do emerge, then there is reason to believe that developments in the general environment that followed our proposed treatment — and not the treatment itself — may explain our results.

Given the data requirements of our matching strategy, we focus on the 2001 recession. It is easy to show that the credit conditions that accompanied the 2001 recession are very different from the credit crisis that started in 2007. Consider, for example, the figures that we analyzed in Section 2.1.1. At the onset of the crisis (February 2001), 3-month LIBOR and commercial paper spreads were at 0.4% and 0.3%, respectively. These spreads declined during 2001, to levels close to 0.1% (LIBOR) and 0.1% (commercial paper) in December 2001. There is also no evidence of increases in credit spreads during 2001. Investment-grade and junk bond spreads were 1.9% and 8.2%, respectively, at the onset of the recession (February 2001). They remained close to these levels during 2001, ending the year at 1.8% (investment-grade) and 8.0% (junk). The evidence we gather suggests that the 2001 recession was not accompanied by a credit supply shock of significant magnitude.

We replicate our baseline experiment for the 2001 recession as if there was a pronounced credit supply shock at the beginning of that recession. To be precise, we take that the treatment period is the first quarter of 2001 (as opposed to the fourth quarter of 2007). Analogously, the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods are, respectively, the last three quarters of 2000 and the last three quarters of 2001. If our prior results simply reflected the differential response of treatment and control groups to a recession (regardless of the credit contraction), we should see similarly strong treatment–control contrasts in these new tests. However, this is not what we find. The simple difference-in-differences estimator for investment outcomes in the 2001 recession yields a positive, statistically insignificant value of 1.2% (compared to equal to −2.2% in the 2007 baseline). Similarly, the Abadie-Imbens ATT estimate for this test is 1.4% (compared to −2.5% for 2007).

This post-treatment–recession check makes it difficult for one to argue that effects that are associated with recessions — and not a credit supply shortage — might explain the results of our tests.

\footnote{Information on debt maturity from COMSPUSTAT for the 1980’s and 1990’s recessions is considerably more sparse.}

\footnote{These data come from Citigroup’s \textit{Yieldbook} (described in Section 2.1.1).}
4.3 Robustness of Treatment Assignments

To test whether refinancing frictions have real implications, our benchmark estimation assigns to the treatment group firms whose long-term debt due in 2008 is greater than 20% of total long-term debt. The benchmark case also focuses on firms for which the ratio of long-term debt maturing in more than one year to total assets was higher than 5%. These are arbitrary choices that we make for the purpose of operationalizing our test. However, it is important that we verify what happens when we alter these cutoffs.

4.3.1 Changing the Due-to-Total Long-Term Debt Cutoff

We first experiment with changes in the ratio of due-to-total long-term debt. The test we design is such that, else the same, this cutoff captures the importance of the financing shortfall caused by the maturing debt. One would expect the impact of the maturing debt to be smaller if firms had smaller proportions of their debt coming due in 2008, and larger if firms had larger proportions of their debt maturing at that time. In the logic of the treatment-effect framework, this is akin to expecting smaller (larger) effects to be associated with smaller (larger) doses of the treatment. Accordingly, we examine what happens to our central results as we experiment with alternative cutoffs of the due-to-total long-term debt ratio. We do this focusing on cutoffs that are located in the neighborhood of the benchmark case.

The results of this experiment are presented in Table 6. In the first column, we report the changes in investment that obtain when we experiment with a 15% cutoff for the ratio of long-term debt due in 2008 to total long-term debt. As should be expected, the differences between treatment and control groups becomes smaller after we allow into the treatment group firms with lower proportion of debt maturing in 2008 (the treatment group size increases to 129). The simple difference-in-differences estimate is −1.5%, while the ATT is −1.3% (both only marginally statistically significant). This contrasts with our benchmark result (20% cutoff), which is reported in the second column of the table. In the third column of the table, the test only includes firms whose proportion of long-term debt due in 2008 is higher than 25% of long-term debt. The test now focuses on 62 firms with very larger portions of debt coming due in the crisis. Consistent with our priors, the fall in investment for treated firms relative to control firms becomes more pronounced, equal to −3.7% of capital (significant at the 1% test level).

Table 6 About Here

4.3.2 Changing the Long-Term Leverage Cutoff

Long-term debt maturity should matter only for firms that have significant amounts of long-term debt in their capital structures. According to the logic of our strategy, increasing the cutoff for the fraction
of long-term debt in firms’ capital structures should result in larger post-crisis effects of maturity on investment. By the same token, including firms that do not have significant long-term debt should weaken the estimated effects.

Table 7 shows evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis. In the first column, we report the changes in investment that obtain when we allow into the sample those firms whose long-term debt maturing in more than one year is less than 5% of assets (i.e., we eliminate the 5% debt-to-asset cut-off). Consistent with expectations, the estimated differences between treatment and control groups disappear after this change. The simple difference-in-differences estimate is 0.0%, while the ATT is now positive at 0.2% (both are statistically insignificant). This contrasts with the 5% benchmark case, which is displayed in the second column of the table. In the third column, the test only includes firms whose long-term debt maturing in more than one year is greater than 10% of assets. Now, the fall in investment for treated firms is much deeper, equal to −3.4% of capital (significant at 5% level).

The evidence in Tables 6 and 7 help substantiate the hypothesis that treated firms found it difficult to refinance their maturing long-term debt during the crisis period, cutting their investment as a result.

4.4 Pre-Determined Maturity Tests

Our baseline experiment uses maturity variables measured at the end of 2007, just a few months following the August credit panic. As explained in Section 2.3, we made this choice to make sure that we capture the extent to which firms are constrained by debt maturity following the credit shock. This requirement should increase the power of our tests. However, it may raise the concern that measured variation in maturity reflects the anticipated effects of the crisis. A particularly problematic alternative explanation is the following. Suppose that higher quality managers were more likely to anticipate the credit crisis in early 2007, or even in 2006. Then, it is possible that unobservable managerial quality could explain both longer maturity profile and superior firm performance in the aftermath of the crisis. Such refinancing activity by “smart CEOs” would leave only the “dumb CEOs” with long-term debt maturing in 2008. In this way, some firms (those with “dumb CEOs”) may cut investment for non-maturity-related reasons after the credit crisis hits. The placebo tests of Section 4.1 do not address this self-selection concern because this is a crisis-specific story.

A simple way to ensure that the anticipation of the crisis by “smart CEOs” does not drive our results is to use maturity variables measured in years prior to the end of 2007. For example, we can examine firms’ maturity profiles at the end of 2005 — about two years before the crisis — and identify firms that had a large fraction of their long-term debt maturing in three years (i.e., in 2008). Since
it is unlikely that even the best managers could have anticipated the 2007 credit crisis back in 2005, such modification of our basic specification can address the unobservable managerial quality story. For robustness, we also experiment with using a maturity profile measured an additional two years earlier, fiscal-year end 2003, which is the earliest we can go back given COMPUSTAT’s information on long-term debt maturity. Naturally, as we go back to earlier years to measure maturity, the effect of maturity structure on 2008 investment should decrease in magnitude (since the maturity information becomes stale with time). For both earlier snapshots (2003 and 2005), the treatment group again includes firms that have more than 20% of their long-term debt at the time maturing in 2008. Other than using alternative pre-determined maturity profiles to assign treatment and non-treatment groups, all other components of the experiment remain unchanged. Accordingly, the outcome variables are defined identically to those in Table 3, that is, changes in investment between the first three quarters of 2008 and the first three quarters of 2007.

The results (untabulated) suggest that the pre-determined maturity profiles also help predict changes in investment around the credit crisis. As expected, the effects of maturity structure on investment (−1.4% when using the 2005 maturity and −0.6% when using the 2003 maturity) are smaller than those estimated in Table 3, nonetheless, they are still economically meaningful.23 These results suggest that the managerial quality hypothesis is not likely to explain the relation between debt maturity and investment that we report in Table 3.

4.5 Different Specifications for the Matching Estimator

We have also experimented with several variations in our procedure to construct treatment and control groups, as well as in the set of matching covariates. To illustrate the robustness of our results, we report two of these exercises in this section.

Our benchmark specification defines the treatment group as all firms for which the ratio of long-term debt maturing within one year to total long-term debt is greater than 20%. The non-treated group contains all the other firms that satisfy the sampling restrictions (in particular, a minimum level of long-term debt over assets). As an alternative approach, we considered a control group that includes only firms that have more than 20% of their long-term debt maturing in exactly five years (that is, in 2012). These firms are similar to those in the treatment group in that they also allow their maturity structures to be poorly diversified across years. However, they happen to have concentrated their maturity in a time period that lies far in the future.24 The estimated difference in investment changes (the matching estimator ATT) remains negative, equal to −1.6%, and statistically significant.

23 The difference in investment using the end-of-year 2005 debt maturity is significant at the 5%. The difference in investment using the end-of-year 2003 debt maturity is statistically insignificant (t-statistic equal to 1.0).

24 We choose five years because this is the farthest one-year information that is available in COMPUSTAT.
We have also experimented with including the 2007 investment level among the set of matching covariates to ensure that we are comparing firms that were at the same starting point of investment before the crisis. The matching estimator’s average treatment effect is virtually unchanged after this modification in the set of covariates; point estimate of $-2.3\%$, with a standard error of 0.9.

4.6 Standard Regression Tests

While the non-parametric matching approach is well-suited for our test strategy, it is useful to show that our results also hold when we use a standard regression approach. To do this, we regress the investment outcome variable considered in our tests on a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the ratio of long-term debt maturing in 2008 to total long-term debt is greater than 20%, and zero otherwise. For all specifications, we also perform placebo regressions that focus on changes in investment during non-crisis periods (the years between 2001 and 2007). We also run a pooled 2001–2008 OLS regression to estimate differences between the crisis and non-crisis periods.

As shown in Panel A of Table 3, without including controls in the OLS, firms with over 20% of their long-term debt maturing in 2008 cut their investment by 1.6% more than other firms. That group-mean difference estimate is significant at the 10% test level. Over the pre-crisis period (2001–2007), when we would expect a firm’s debt maturity to have no effect on investment decisions, the difference across the two groups is essentially zero (point estimate of $-0.1\%$). The difference in the two estimates (financial crisis effect less pre-financial crisis effect) is a fall in investment of 1.5% (significant at the 10% test level). We also estimate investment regressions including all of the controls used in Panel B of Table 3 (size, industry, credit ratings, $Q$, long-term leverage ratio, cash flows, and cash holdings). While these firm controls predict changes in investment in their own right, their inclusion does not substantially alter the coefficient on debt maturity. The estimated group-mean difference changes slightly to 1.7% (significant at the 5% level) after we add those controls. Over the pre-crisis period, this difference is again essentially zero (point estimate of 0.0%), yielding a difference in the two estimates (financial crisis less pre-financial crisis) of a fall in investment of 1.7% (significant at the 5% level). These results are consistent with those reported under the matching estimator approach.

4.7 How Did the Treated Firms Respond to the Credit Crisis?

The evidence thus far suggests that firms with large amounts of debt maturing in 2008 were forced to cut investment in order to be able to repay their maturing debt. However, investment is not the

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25 We discuss the results for regression models that use the same controls of the matching estimations for consistency. However, a number of other OLS specifications (with added controls, such as variables in changes) lead to similar results.
only policy variable that these firms could have adjusted in the aftermath of the crisis. Here, we examine post-crisis changes in other policies that the treated firms could have used to absorb the effect of the credit squeeze. Even if it was difficult or impossible for firms to respond to the crisis by issuing additional external finance, they could potentially make up for the debt payment by adjusting other variables, such as drawing down cash reserves, reducing stocks of inventory, repurchasing fewer shares, and/or cutting dividends. If the treated firms found it necessary to cut investment (which is a costly measure), one would also expect them to adjust, for example, the amount of share repurchase activities that they undertake in the aftermath of the crisis.\textsuperscript{26} In addition, one could expect firms to draw down on their cash balances and reduce inventories. The literature suggests that cash balances are held in part to hedge against negative shocks such as the 2007 crisis (see Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004)). Moreover, there is evidence that firms use inventories to smooth out the effects of fluctuations in the availability of internal funds (Fazzari and Petersen (1993)).

To provide some evidence on these additional policies, we perform a simple, “back-of-the-envelope” analysis of how the firms in our experiment responded to the credit crisis. Across our treated firms, we calculated the average amount of long-term debt due in 2008, as well as the amount of “cuts” conducted elsewhere to help pay off this debt (besides investment reductions) — inventories, share repurchases, dividends, and cash holdings. These variables were present for 77 of our 86 treated firms.

For this sample of 77 firms, we compute the average changes in all of the policy variables above, between the first three quarters of 2007 and the first three quarters of 2008. For our two stock variables (cash holdings and inventories), we just take the differences in the average value of their levels in the first three quarters of 2008 relative to the first three quarters of 2007. For the quarterly flow variables (investment, share repurchases, and dividends), we convert the differences in the average quarterly flow to an annual flow basis for ease of comparison with the stock variables. For example, the quarterly reduction of investment (normalized by capital) of 2.1% for the treated firms reported in the first row of Panel B of Table 3, represents an annual decline of 8.4%. To facilitate comparisons with our estimate of the fall in investment, we normalize all other variables by the value of the capital stock as well. We then take averages across all 77 of our treated firms to see how much they drew down their cash reserves, cut dividends, etc. We finally compare these figures with the average amount of debt they had coming due in 2008.

Figure 5 provides a visual illustration of the treated firms’ broader response to the credit crisis. In this figure, we report the average changes in various corporate policy variables as a fraction of the total amount of long-term debt maturing in 2008. The decline in investment spending in 2008 represents

\textsuperscript{26}The survey evidence in Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) suggests that share repurchases are the residual after the investment and dividend decisions have been made.
about one-eighth of the amount of long-term debt these firms had coming due in 2008. By comparison, the treated firms drew down from their cash reserves amounts that represent about two-fifths of the amount of debt due in 2008. These firms reduced share repurchases (relative to 2007 levels) by an amount representing about one-tenth of the debt due. And reductions in their inventories accounted for another 7% of the 2008-maturing debt. Given executives’ strong aversion to cutting dividends (see Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005)), it is perhaps not surprising that dividend cuts during 2008 accounted for only 1% of the amount of debt due for the treated firms. The remaining 29% is explained by other factors (such as reductions in R&D, labor costs, asset sales, and perhaps limited issuance of securities).27

While admittedly done solely for purposes of providing a crude approximation for how the treated firms responded to the financial crisis, the numbers depicted in Figure 5 fits our economic intuition very well. In particular, the figure suggests that firms that were burdened with large amounts of maturing debt in 2008 drew heavily on their least costly sources of funds (such as cash holdings) in order to mitigate the effects of maturing debt, but had to ultimately cut back on real activities, such as investment spending.

4.8 Further Analysis of the Treated Firms’ Finances

To better understand how financing shortages affected firms in the crisis, we also looked at credit lines (see Ivashina and Scharfstein (2009) and Campello et al. (2010) for related discussions). A potential challenge is that firms in our treatment group could have markedly different amounts of unused lines of credit (perhaps affecting our results). This investigation required us to look directly at the 10-Ks of the firms in our treatment group.

Our textual analysis shows that 77% of the firms in our treatment group had a line of credit and that the average ratio of total (unused) credit lines over total assets at the fourth quarter of 2007 was equal to 15.2% (9.9%). To gauge the meaning of those numbers, we consider a sample of random firms studied by Sufi (2009). In Sufi’s dataset, 75% of the firms report a line of credit and the ratio of total (unused) lines to assets is equal to 15.9% (10.2%). These numbers suggest that our treated firms’ access to short-term financing was similar to that of the average firm in the economy. Our calculations further suggest that if firms were allowed to draw down all of the funds available in their lines of credit, they could only pay for a fraction of the long-term debt obligations coming due in the crisis.

27 Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) survey 574 U.S. CFOs at the end of 2008, asking managers about the measures they adopt to cope with the credit crisis. The managers in their survey report cuts of 11% in their firms’ R&D expenditures and another 4% in their work force. Moreover, nearly 50% of the CFOs surveyed say that they sold assets in 2008 to cope with the credit squeeze.
We also examine the concentration of long-term debt maturity across treated, control, and non-treated firms. One potential concern is that treated firms’ long-term debt maturity could be comparatively more concentrated, and that could be correlated with characteristics that explain their performance during the crisis (for example, poor financial management). To examine this issue, we consider the Herfindahl index (HHI) measure of debt concentration that we discuss in Section 2.1.2. We find that the HHI of long-term debt for treated, control, and non-treated firms are, respectively, 0.38, 0.37, and 0.34. These numbers are economically and statistically identical, suggesting that these groups of firms historically issued debt at the same frequency, but the treated firms were just unfortunate enough to have a good share of their debt coming due right after August 2007.

Finally, we make use of ex-post data to check our hypothesis about a freeze in the market for long-term debt during the crisis (refinancing constraints). To do so, we look at the debt issuance activity of our treated firms, calculating the ratio of long-term debt issuance in 2008 to the long-term debt that was due in 2008. Corroborating our hypothesis, we find that the mean (median) issuance-to-maturing debt ratio is only 12.6% (0.0%) in 2008. Our study traces the impact of this abrupt financing shortfall on firms’ outcomes.

5 Concluding Remarks

We use the August 2007 credit panic to assess the effect of financial contracting on real corporate policies. In particular, we test whether firms with large fractions of their long-term debt maturing at the time of the crisis observe more pronounced negative outcomes than otherwise similar firms whose debt structure is such that they did not need to refinance during the crisis. Our empirical methodology aims at replicating an experiment-like test in which we control for observed and time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity via a difference-in-differences matching estimator.

We find evidence that the terms of long-term financial contracting can have significant implications for firms’ real and financial policies when they face a credit shock. Firms whose long-term debt was largely maturing right after the third quarter of 2007 cut their quarterly investment rates by 2.5 percentage points more than otherwise similar firms whose debt was due well after the crisis. This relative decrease in investment for firms with maturity “spikes” during the crisis is statistically significant and economically large (approximately one-third of the pre-crisis level of investment for these firms). A number of falsification and placebo tests confirm our inferences about the effect of credit supply shocks on corporate policies.

Our results contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, our identification strategy shows a novel link between debt maturity and corporate investment. In particular, our results point
to the importance of maturity structure for corporate financial flexibility. As a matter of corporate policy, our study highlights the extra attention firm managers should pay to the maturity profile of their firms’ debt. Second, our results provide evidence that the 2007 credit crisis had significant real effects on corporate behavior in 2008. Third, our evidence suggests that debt maturity structure is an important variable in understanding how credit supply shocks spread through the corporate sector — beyond what one can learn by looking at firms’ leverage ratios. Undoubtedly, understanding the effects of credit cycles (and credit crises in particular) is not only of interest for corporate finance researchers, but also important for economic policymakers. More broadly, our findings provide new evidence that financial contracting has causal effects on real corporate outcomes. Our study characterizes one precise channel (a contracting feature) that shows how financing affects investment.
References


Table 1: Characteristics of Treated, Non-Treated, and Control Firms at the end of 2007

This table compares the properties of treated, non-treated, and control firms (median comparisons). The 1,067 sample firms are split into treated and non-treated groups. The treated firms are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year (i.e., 2008) is greater than 20 percent and non-treated firms are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year is less than or equal to 20 percent. Control firms are a subset of the non-treated firms selected as the closest match to the treated firms based on a set of firm characteristics: Q, cash flow, size, cash holdings, long-term debt normalized by assets, 2-digit SIC industry, and credit ratings. There are 86 treated firms and 86 control firms. The medians of Q, cash flow, size, cash holdings, and long-term leverage are displayed for the three samples of firms (treated, non-treated, and controls). The average quarterly investment-to-capital ratio over the first three quarters of 2007 is also displayed. See text for further variable definitions. The test for a difference in the medians of a firm characteristic across two groups is conducted by calculating the continuity-correct Pearson’s χ² statistic, with the p-values of this test reported at the bottom row of each panel.

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<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>1.728</td>
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Table 2: Distributional Tests of Treated, Non-Treated, and Control Firms at the end of 2007

This table compares distributional properties of the various matching covariates of treated, non-treated, and control firms. The 1,067 sample firms are split into treated and non-treated groups. The treated firms are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year (i.e., 2008) is greater than 20 percent and non-treated firms are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year is less than or equal to 20 percent. Control firms are a subset of the non-treated firms selected as the closest match to the treated firms based on a set of firm characteristics: Q, cash flow, size, cash holdings, long-term debt normalized by assets, 2-digit SIC industry, and credit ratings. There are 86 treated firms and 86 control firms. The medians of Q, cash flow, size, cash holdings, and long-term leverage are displayed for the three samples of firms (treated, non-treated, and controls). The average quarterly investment-to-capital ratio over the first three quarters of 2007 is also displayed. See text for further variable definitions. The 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile are reported for each firm characteristic. The test for differences in the distribution of a firm characteristic across two groups is conducted by calculating the corrected Kolmogorov-Smirnov’s D-statistic, with the p-values of this test reported in the rightmost column.

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</tbody>
</table>
Panel A and Panel B of this table present estimates of the change in average quarterly investment rates from the first three quarters of 2007 to the first three quarters of 2008 (before and after the fall 2007 credit crisis). Panel C presents an estimate of the change in investment from the first three quarters of 2006 to the first three quarters of 2007 (a placebo test conducted before the credit crisis). In Panel A, the average of quarterly investment during the first three quarters of 2008 and the first three quarters of 2007 is calculated for the treated firms and non-treated firms, as well as the difference in the difference between the two groups of firms over the two years. The average quarterly investment is normalized by the capital stock at the preceding quarter; that is, by lagged property, plant, and equipment. The treated firms are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year (i.e., 2008) is greater than 20 percent and non-treated firms are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year is less than or equal to 20 percent. There are 86 treated firms and 981 non-treated firms in Panel A. In Panel B, the average of quarterly investment during the first three quarters of 2008 and the first three quarters of 2007 is calculated for the treated firms and control firms, as well as the difference in the difference between the two groups of firms over the two years. Control firms are a subset of the non-treated firms selected as the closest match to the treated firms based on a set of firm characteristics: Q, cash flow, size, cash holdings, long-term debt normalized by assets, 2-digit SIC industry, and credit ratings. There are 86 treated firms and 86 control firms in Panel B. Panel C is constructed analogously, but the tests are conducted one year earlier (before the credit crisis). There are 113 treated firms and 113 control firms in Panel B. ATT is the Abadie-Imbens bias corrected average treated effect matching estimator (Matching Estimator). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
**Average Quarterly Investment / Capital Stock**
(in percentage points)

### Panel A: Investment Before and After the Fall 2007 Credit Crisis

Investment in 2008 (Q1 to Q3) vs. Investment in 2007 (Q1 to Q3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treated Firms</strong></td>
<td>7.83***</td>
<td>5.70***</td>
<td>–2.13** (0.89) (0.50) (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Treated Firms</strong></td>
<td>6.54***</td>
<td>5.98***</td>
<td>–0.56*** (0.20) (0.16) (0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Difference</strong></td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>–0.28</td>
<td>–1.57* (0.91) (0.53) (0.85)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Panel B: Investment Before and After the Fall 2007 Credit Crisis

Investment in 2008 (Q1 to Q3) vs. Investment in 2007 (Q1 to Q3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treated Firms</strong></td>
<td>7.83***</td>
<td>5.70***</td>
<td>–2.13** (0.89) (0.50) (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Firms</strong></td>
<td>7.26***</td>
<td>7.35***</td>
<td>0.09 (0.70) (0.64) (0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Difference</strong></td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>–1.65***</td>
<td>–2.21** (0.96) (0.62) (1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Matching Estimator</strong></td>
<td><strong>–2.46</strong>** (ATT) (1.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Panel C: The Placebo Test

Investment in 2007 (Q1 to Q3) vs. Investment in 2006 (Q1 to Q3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treated Firms</strong></td>
<td>7.27***</td>
<td>6.86***</td>
<td>–0.41 (0.63) (0.65) (0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Firms</strong></td>
<td>7.17***</td>
<td>6.89***</td>
<td>–0.28 (0.76) (0.66) (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Difference</strong></td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>–0.03</td>
<td>–0.13 (0.84) (0.79) (1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Matching Estimator</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.01</strong> (ATT) (1.09)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Table 4: Difference-in-Differences of Firm Investment from One Year to the Next: 2001 through 2007

This table presents an estimate of the change in investment from the first three quarters of a given year to the first three quarters of the next year. The first row replicates the Difference-in-Differences and Matching Estimator (ATT) from Panel B of Table 3 and the second row replicates the Difference-in-Differences and Matching Estimator (ATT) from Panel C of Table 3. Analogous results are then presented for the other years. The treated firms are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year is greater than 20 percent and control firms are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year is less than or equal to 20 percent. Control firms are the closest matches to the treated firms based on a set of firm characteristics (see the description in Table 3 for details). ATT is the Abadie-Imbens bias-corrected average treated effect matching estimator (Matching Estimator). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investment Change</th>
<th>Difference in the change in investment between treated and control firms (in percentage points)</th>
<th>Matching Estimator (ATT) (in percentage points)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008 – 2007</td>
<td>-2.21**</td>
<td>-2.46**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 – 2006</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.02)</td>
<td>(1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 – 2005</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 – 2004</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 – 2003</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 – 2002</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 – 2001</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
<td>(0.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pooled Analysis: All Years</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before Fall 2007 Credit Crisis</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Table 5: Trends in Investment for Treated and Control Firms: Mean and Median Comparisons

This table reports the mean and median quarterly change in investment for firms in the treatment and control groups going back many years prior to the fourth quarter of 2007. The first row in the table reports statistics for changes in investment going back two years prior to the crisis (quarterly investment changes from 2005Q3 through 2007Q3). A similar calculation is reported in the second row of the table, but the data goes back three years prior to the 2007 crisis quarter (starting in 2004Q3). Subsequent rows go back farther in time at larger increments. The table also reports p-values associated with test statistics for differences in means (standard t-test) and in medians (continuity-correct Pearson’s $\chi^2$) across groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Horizon</th>
<th>Treatment Mean [Median] (in percentage points)</th>
<th>Control Mean [Median]</th>
<th>P-Value of Difference $t$-test [Pearson $\chi^2$]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 years prior to 2007Q4</td>
<td>−0.11 [0.07]</td>
<td>−0.42 [0.05]</td>
<td>0.60 [0.99]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 years prior to 2007Q4</td>
<td>−0.20 [0.03]</td>
<td>−0.16 [0.10]</td>
<td>0.93 [0.47]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years prior to 2007Q4</td>
<td>−0.07 [0.05]</td>
<td>−0.10 [0.11]</td>
<td>0.94 [0.55]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 years prior to 2007Q4</td>
<td>−0.19 [0.04]</td>
<td>−0.06 [0.11]</td>
<td>0.70 [0.45]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 years prior to 2007Q4</td>
<td>−0.21 [0.03]</td>
<td>−0.18 [0.03]</td>
<td>0.89 [0.92]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6: Difference-in-Differences of Firm Investment Before and After the Fall 2007 Credit Crisis: Different Cutoffs for the ratio of Long-Term Debt Due in 2008 to Total Long-Term Debt

This table presents estimates of the change in investment from the first three quarters of 2007 to the first three quarters of 2008 for alternative treatment-assignment cutoffs for the proportion of long-term debt due in 2008 to total long-term debt: (1) more than 15%, (2) more than 20%, and (3) more than 25%. The benchmark case result (from Panel B of Table 3) is presented in the middle column for ease of comparison. Control firms are the closest matches to the treated firms based on a set of firm characteristics (see the description in Table 3 for details). ATT is the Abadie-Imbens bias-corrected average treated effect matching estimator (Matching Estimator). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long-Term Debt Due in 2008 &gt; 15%</th>
<th>Long-Term Debt Due in 2008 &gt; 20%</th>
<th>Long-Term Debt Due in 2008 &gt; 25%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change in Investment for Treated Firms</td>
<td>-1.72*** (0.62)</td>
<td>-2.13** (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Investment for Control Firms</td>
<td>-0.27 (0.56)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-1.45* (0.76)</td>
<td>-2.21** (1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matching Estimator (ATT)</td>
<td>-1.34* (0.76)</td>
<td>-2.46** (1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms in Treatment Group</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Table 7: Difference-in-Differences of Firm Investment Before and After the Fall 2007 Credit Crisis: Different Cutoffs for Long-Term Leverage Ratio

This table presents estimates of the change in investment from the first three quarters of 2007 to the first three quarters of 2008 for alternative cutoffs for the ratio of debt due in more than one year to total assets: (1) more than 0%, (2) more than 5%, and (3) more than 10%. The benchmark case result (from Panel B of Table 3) is presented in the middle column for ease of comparison. Control firms are the closest matches to the treated firms based on a set of firm characteristics (see the description in Table 3 for details). ATT is the Abadie-Imbens bias-corrected average treated effect matching estimator (Matching Estimator). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long-Term Leverage &gt; 0%</th>
<th>Long-Term Leverage &gt; 5%</th>
<th>Long-Term Leverage &gt; 10%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change in Investment</td>
<td>-1.09*</td>
<td>-2.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for Treated Firms</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Investment</td>
<td>-1.09*</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for Control Firms</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-2.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matching Estimator (ATT)</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>-2.46**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.78)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms in Treatment Group</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Figure 1: LIBOR and Commercial Paper (CP) Spreads During the 2007-2009 Credit Crisis

This figure displays the 3-month LIBOR and commercial paper (CP) spreads over comparable-maturity treasuries, for the period of January 2004 to August 2009. The data is from http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/.
Figure 2: Corporate Bond Spreads During the 2007 Credit Crisis

This figure displays the time series of spreads for indices of investment-grade and high-yield bonds from January 2004 to August 2009. The data are from Citigroup’s Yieldbook. The investment-grade index is Citigroup’s BIG_CORP index, which included only corporate bonds and has an average credit quality of A. The high–yield bond index is Citigroup’s HY_MARKET index, which has an average credit quality equal to B+. The spreads are calculated with respect to the 5-year treasury rate (data from http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/.)

Panel A: Investment-grade spreads

Panel B: High-yield spreads
Figure 3: Composition of Long-Term Debt Maturity at the end of 2007

This figure displays the amount of long-term debt maturing in the years of 2008 to 2012, as a fraction of total long-term debt, for the sample of firms described in Section 2.3. Maturity structure is measured at the end of the 2007 fiscal year.
Figure 4: Composition of Long-Term Debt Maturity: 1999 to 2006

This figure displays the amount of long-term debt maturing in one to five years away from an initial year \( t \), as a fraction of total long-term debt, for the sample of firms described in Section 2.3. Maturity structure is measured at the end of fiscal year \( t \), with \( t \) varying from 1999 to 2006.
Figure 5: How did Treated Firms Pay Off Their Debt?

This figure displays changes in policy variables from the first three quarters of 2007 to the first three quarters of 2008, as a fraction of the amount of long-term debt maturing in 2008, for the sample of 77 treated firms for which we have complete data on investment, cash holdings, cash dividends, inventories, and share repurchases. Treated firms are those which have more than 20% of their long-term debt maturing in 2008.